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STATEMENT OF JURISTICTION 
On April 13, 2009, the Fourth District Court issued a Decision granting 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 538. Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal from the judgment on May 4, 2009. R. 582-84. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on a determination that Plaintiff, who was injured when 
she slipped and fell on a puddle of water, presented insufficient evidence of the 
length of time the puddle was on the floor to show constructive notice. 
A. Standard of Review: This is an appeal from Summary Judgment, which 
presents a question of law to the appellate court; the standard of review is one of 
correctness, and the court views "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the [appellant]." Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 
173 P.3d 199, 201 (Ut. C. A. 2007) (quoting Bowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915, 917 (Utah 
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
B. Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 584), 
which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
issue was raised in Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs response to 
1 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. R. 
249, 391, & 565. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment when it concluded that a store-owner could not be vicariously 
liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor to whom it delegated the 
activity of cleaning the floor. 
A. Standard of Review: This is an appeal from summary judgment, so the 
standard of review is one of correctness. The court views facts and reasonable inferences 
in the light most favorable to the appellant. Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 173 
P.3d 199, 201 (Utat Ct. App 2007) (quoting Bowling v. Bullen, 94 P.3d 915,917 (Utah 
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
B. Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. 584. 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mrs. Price raised this issue in response to 
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment which preserved this issue for appeal. R. 293. 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no applicable constitutional or statutory provisions in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case stems from a slip-and-fall that happened in a Smith's Food and Drug 
Centers, Inc., supermarket (hereinafter "Smith's"). Plaintiff/Appellant, Judy Price, 
slipped and fell on a puddle of water and suffered injuries; including a broken arm and a 
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hip injury that requires surgery. Mrs. Price brought several causes of action against 
Smith's but appeals only in regard to two of those causes: first, that the store was 
negligent when it failed to inspect an area of the store where it had allowed an 
independent contractor to work for the day; and second, that the store should be 
vicariously liable for the negligence of the independent contractor for causing the 
hazardous puddle. The Fourth District Court for the State of Utah granted Smith's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on both counts mentioned above concluding as a matter 
of law that, under either theory of liability, Mrs. Price would be unable to recover. 
The issues before this court are, first, whether Mrs. Price presented sufficient 
evidence of the length of time the water was on the floor to establish constructive notice; 
and second, whether the store can be vicariously liable for the negligence of an in-store 
food demonstrator (independent contractor) for harm to Mrs. Price caused by the 
demonstrator's failure to clean up the floor after the demonstration. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 2, 2005, Steven Tyler, an employee of a food demonstrator Pyggy, Inc., 
d.b.a. Market Source West., (hereinafter "Pyggy") spent the day handing out meat and 
cheese to customers in Smith's American Fork store. R. 248. Pyggy brought its own 
demonstration equipment and table, but purchased the food samples from Smith's. R. 
247. 
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According to Mr. Tyler of Pyggy, he took down his demonstration table at 4:40 in 
the afternoon, counted the remaining meat and cheese products, paid for the product 
provided by Smith's, and left the store by 5:00 pm. R. 177. 
Smith's had a policy that prior to demonstrators like Pyggy leaving the store that 
the demonstrator needed to check out with Smith's employees. R. 278. 
Smith's does not have a safety policy in place for checking or cleaning a 
demonstration area after an in-store demonstration. R. 281. Smith's has a general policy 
of checking the floor once an hour. R. 248. 
Ms. Price did not dispute allegations by Smith's that they conducted numerous 
regular inspections of the entire store at or around the time of her fall. R. 301. 
However, no Smith's employee checked or inspected the area of the food 
demonstration immediately after Pyggy left to make sure it was clean or free of debris. 
R.280,295,299,359. 
Shortly after 5:00 pm, Plaintiff Judy Price went to Smith's with her granddaughter 
to buy strawberries. R. 250, 303. As she was leaving the produce section of the store 
with her strawberries, Ms. Price fell on a puddle of water, breaking her arm and injuring 
her hip. R. 298-99. Ms. Price thinks the accident happened after 5:00 pm, around 5:20. 
R. 303. 
No one knows for sure how the water got onto the floor, or exactly how long it had 
been there. Although Mr. Tyler is adamant that he did not have water at his 
demonstration table (R. 365-66), Chuck Brown, the store manager for Smith's at the time 
of the incident, testified that he was sure the water came from the demonstration table. R. 
4 
298. Mr. Brown concluded this because Ms. Price fell at the site of the demonstration 
table, and because he noticed a cup of water on the demonstration table when he went to 
talk to Mr. Tyler earlier in the day. R. 298. Mr. Brown stated he was almost 100% sure 
the water came from Mr. Tyler's table. R. 298. There is no other evidence suggesting 
any other source of the spilled water. R. 298, 426-27. 
Mr. Brown also testified that he thought the water was on the floor for maybe 10 
minutes. R. 301,278. 
Mr. Brown testified that the water was cleaned up easily with a paper towel. R. 
278-279.1 
After the incident in which Ms. Price slipped and fell on the puddle of water, 
Pyggy went out of business and was found not to have insurance. Transcript of Oral 
Arguments at 25. 
Mrs. Price's supermarket safety expert, Kent Steele, opined that demonstration 
areas are typical areas to anticipate spillage. R. 254. Mr. Steele also opined that Smith's 
conduct fell below the standard of care because Smith's failed to verify that Pyggy left 
the demonstration area clean and spill free when Pyggy checked out. R. 252. 
Page 45 of Alan Brown's deposition was attached to Mrs. Price's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for summary Judgment but was not numbered as part of the paginated 
record. However, that page of Mr. Borwn's deposition fell between pages 279 and 279 of the 
paginated record. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ordinary Negligence. 
The court below dismissed Mrs. Price's claim of ordinary negligence, finding that 
she produced insufficient evidence of the amount of time the puddle was on the floor. 
Mrs. Price challenges that decision. 
Storeowners are required to keep their premises reasonably safe by exercising 
reasonable care. A store can be liable for negligence if it had actual or constructive 
notice of a dangerous condition and failed to remedy it. Constructive notice can be 
imputed to a store if it would have had actual notice had it exercised reasonable care. In 
determining whether a defendant had constructive notice of a dangerous condition, 
evidence of the time the condition existed is relevant. Nevertheless, there is no formulaic 
way to determine what length of time constitutes an abuse of reasonable care. Evidence 
of the condition of the dangerous condition as well as circumstances giving rise to 
inferences of negligence are also relevant. Therefore, constructive notice can be affected 
by the circumstances surrounding and reasonable inferences drawn from a slip and fall. 
Nevertheless, not only did Mrs. Price submit evidence of the length of time the 
puddle of water was on the floor, but she provided evidence that the length of time was 
insignificant to establish constructive notice and a lack of reasonable care. Mrs. Price's 
supermarket safety expert, Kent Steele, testified that Smith's conduct fell below the 
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standard of care when it failed to verify that the demonstrator left the demonstration area 
clean and spill free when the vendor checked out (i.e., a couple minutes or even seconds 
after the vendor checked out would have been too long for the store not to inspect the 
demonstration area). Therefore, there are material questions of fact for a jury and 
summary judgment was improper. This case should be remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
Vicarious Liability. 
Although Utah law has long accepted the general rule that the employer of an 
independent contractor is not generally liable for the tortious act of the contractor, the 
duty of a store to keep its premises reasonably safe is non-delegable. The fact that the 
duty of reasonable care is non-delegable does not change the duty in Utah in any way; it 
merely means that a store cannot avoid liability for dangerous conditions by delegating 
store maintenance to independent contractors. 
Smith's delegated the maintenance activity of cleaning the floor at the food 
demonstration site to an independent contractor. There is evidence that the independent 
contractor was negligent in carrying out the cleaning duty delegated to it. Because 
Smith's delegated a store maintenance activity to an independent contractor who was 
negligent in carrying out that duty, it can be vicariously liable for the injuries caused by 
the independent contractor. Because there is evidence that Plaintiff was injured by the 
negligent acts of the independent contractor to whom Smith's had delegated store 
maintenance, summary judgment was improper, and the case should be remanded for 
further proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Mrs, Price produced evidence of the length of time the water had been on the 
floor prior to her fall and for that reason the trial court improperly granted Smith's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court ignored evidence of the time the water spill was on the floor. 
The job of the court ruling on summary judgment is not to weigh evidence but to 
determine if there are material questions of fact that preclude one party from prevailing as 
a matter of law. According to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Silcox v. 
Skaggs, 814 P.2d 623, 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[I]ssues become questions of law only 
when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from them.") 
(citation omitted). 
Therefore, in determining whether summary judgment should be granted, the court 
need only determine whether material issues of fact exist that preclude judgment as a 
matter of law, not whether certain evidence is weightier than other evidence. Draper City 
v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). The appellate court 
must evaluate whether, based upon the facts and inferences asserted by the appellant, 
there is any law that would entitle her to prevail, in which case summary judgment is 
improper. Draper City v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995). 
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Because negligence cases, such as this one, are heavily fact and inference 
dependent, summary judgment is appropriate in limited circumstances. This Court has 
explained that because "negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from 
facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is 
appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Matheson v. Marbec 
Investments, LLC, 173 P.3d 199, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). The appellant is entitled to "all reasonable inferences in 
determining whether there is a material issue of fact which precludes summary 
judgment." Silcox v. Skaggs, 814 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
Store owners are required to keep their premises reasonably safe by exercising 
reasonable care. It is a well-established principle of Utah premises law that a property 
owner is not an insurer of the safety of his premises, even for business invitees. Martin v. 
Safeway, 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Instead, a property-owner is required to use 
reasonable care to maintain his store in a reasonably safe condition. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166 
P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), affd, 196 P.3d 576 (Utah 2008). 
In explaining the two-part, notice/remedy test of slip-and-fall negligence, the Allen 
court said, 
[Fjault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results therefrom unless 
two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either 
actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed 
long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, 
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sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have 
remedied it. 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). 
Here, since it is undisputed that Smith's did not create the water spill in the present 
matter, nor did it have actual notice of the water spill (R. 245), this brief discusses 
constructive notice as the basis of Smith's liability for ordinary negligence. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that even where there are only tenuous facts 
about the length of time the dangerous condition existed, the plaintiff can still meet her 
burden. Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977) (where the court 
affirmed the trial court's determination that the jury could find constructive notice— 
evidence of the amount of time the dangerous condition existed—where the only 
evidence of the time the dangerous condition existed was the condition of the broken 
spaghetti on the floor). 
In holding that Plaintiffs negligence claim (based on constructive notice) should 
fail, the trial court emphasized the importance of the time factor in determining whether 
constructive notice can be imputed to Smith's. R. 534. The trial court quoted the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision inJex v. JRA, Inc., 196 P.3d 576, 581 (Utah 2008): 
To establish that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store owner 
constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present evidence that it had been there for 
an appreciable time. We have therefore imputed constructive notice to a store 
owner only when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris had been 
on the floor. 
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The trial court decided that Plaintiffs negligence claim failed because "Plaintiff 
has shown no evidence of the length of time the puddle was on the floor." R. 533. 
However, the lower court disregarded Mrs. Price's evidence of the length of time the 
puddle was on the floor. 
Mr. Tyler took his table down at 4:40 in the afternoon, and had left Smith's by 
5:00 pm. R. 177. Mrs. Price testified that she fell between 5:00 and 5:20 in the 
afternoon. R. 224. Therefore, there is a 40 minute window in which water could have 
been on floor. 
Mrs. Price also presented evidence of the length of time the water was on the floor 
in the form of testimony from Smith's store manager, Mr. Brown. 
Mr. Brown based his conclusion on the fact that Mr. Tyler did not take his table 
down until 5:00. He testified he thought the water would hav^ been on the floor for 10 
minutes: 
It couldn't have been too long. Because [Mr. Tyler] left at 5:00 or right before 
that, a few minutes. He was scheduled until 5:00. He cleaned up probably right 
about that time. So between that time and then when Judy fell, it was probably a 
short interval. . . maybe ten minutes, maybe tops, if that. 
R. 278. 
Because Plaintiff presented evidence of the length of time the water was on the 
floor summary judgment was improper and this court should reverse the finding of the 
trial court. 
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II. Smith's duty to keep the store in a reasonably safe condition is nondelegable, 
and therefore Smith's can be liable for the negligence of the independent contractor 
to whom it delegated the duty to clean its floor. 
Utah law has long accepted the general rule that the employer of an independent 
contractor is not generally liable for the tortious acts of the contractor. Gleason v. Salt 
Lake City, 74 P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1937). Nevertheless, there is an exception to this 
general rule when an injury is caused "by the nonperformance of an absolute duty owed 
by the employer [of the independent contractor] to the complainant." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). The duty of a store to keep its premises 
reasonably safe is a therefore a "nondelegable" duty. 
Although Utah cases explaining this principle are rare, it is well settled in 
American jurisprudence that a store can be vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an 
independent contractor when the safety of a store is at issue. William L. Prosser explains, 
in his Handbook of Law of Torts §61 (4th ed. 1971), "It is generally agreed that the 
obligation as to the condition of the premises is of such importance that it cannot be 
delegated, and that the occupier will be liable for the negligence of an independent 
contractor to whom he entrusts maintenance and repair." Id. at 395. Indeed, a 
storeowner cannot discharge responsibility for his duty to maintain his store in a 
reasonably safe condition by delegating the care of the premises to an independent 
Although the court in Gleason used the term "absolute duty," Utah courts in other 
decisions have used the term "nondelegable duty." See e.g. Sullivan v. Utah Gas Service 
Co., 353 P.2d 465, 466 (Utah 1960); Hogge v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., 135 P. 585, 589 
(Utah 1915); Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
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contractor. Lilienthal v. Hastings Clothing Co., 280 P.2d 824, 828 (Cal. App. 1955); see 
also Gill v. Krassner, 77A.2d 462, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950; Thomas E. 
Miller, Annotation, Storekeeper's Liability for Personal Injury to Customer Caused by 
Independent Contractor's Negligence in Performing Alterations or Repair Work, 96 
A.L.R.3d 1213, 1223-25 (1979) (discussion about liability based on vicarious liability 
and nondelegable duty). Therefore, a storeowner can exercise reasonable care and still be 
vicariously liable for negligent acts of an independent contractor. 
Having a nondelegable duty to keep a store reasonably safe is not the same as 
being an insurer of the safety of property. It is a well established principle of Utah 
premises law that a property owner is not an insurer of the safety of his premises, even 
for business invitees. Martin v. Safeway, 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Instead, a 
property-owner is required to use reasonable care to maintain his store in a reasonably 
safe condition. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166 P.3d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), affd, 196 P.3d 576 
(Utah 2008). The fact that the duty of reasonable care is nondelegable does not change 
the duty in any way. It merely means that a store cannot avoid liability for dangerous 
conditions by delegating store maintenance to independent contractors. See Gill, 77A.2d 
at 464. 
A store is liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor when it delegates 
maintenance and repair activities to the contractor. See Prosser at 395. There are many 
cases in which storeowners were held liable for the negligent repair activities of 
independent contractors. See e.g. Goodman v. Sears Roebuck Co., 129 A.2d 405 (D.C. 
1957) (plaintiff fell on temporary covered); Daly v. Bergstedt, 126 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 
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1964) (plaintiff tripped on masonite molding); Lipman Wolfe & Co. v. Teeples & 
Thatcher, Inc., 522 P.2d 467 (Oregon 1974) (plaintiff fell on slippery tile-laying 
substance); Bryant v. Sherm's Thunder bird Market, 522 P.2d 1383 (Oregon 1974) 
(plaintiff fell in uncovered ditch in supermarket aisle); see also 96 A.L.R.3d 1223-25. 
There are also cases dealing with storeowner liability for general maintenance 
activities negligently conducted by independent contractors, such as cleaning or waxing 
the floor. See e.g. Lilienthal v. Hastings Clothing Co., 280 P.2d 824, 828 (Cal. App. 
1955) (plaintiff slipped on newly waxed floor); Gill v. Krassner, 77A.2d 462, 464 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (plaintiff fell on excessively waxed floor); Huddleston v. 
Lerman, 73 A.2d 596 (NJ Super 1950) (plaintiff fell on slippery floor); Little v. Butner, 
348 P.2d 1022 (Kan. 1960) (plaintiff slipped and fell on meat samples); see also 
Annotation, Liability of Proprietor of Store, Office, or Similar Business Premises for Fall 
on Floor Made Slippery by Waxing or Oiling, 63 A.L.R.2d 591, 641-42 (1959) 
(discussing acts of persons other than employees). 
Floor cleaning is a maintenance activity. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
maintenance as "the care and work put into property to keep it operating and productive; 
general repair and upkeep." Black's Law Dictionary 1139 (9th ed. 2009). The American 
Law Institute makes a distinction between repair activities and general maintenance 
activities, such as cleaning, mopping, or waxing floors, and discusses them as separate 
topics. See 96 A.L.R.3d at 1216, n. 5 ("Not covered herein are cases involving injuries to 
a customer caused by negligence in such general maintenance or janitorial procedures as 
cleaning, mopping floors, scrubbing walls, and woodwork, or oiling, waxing, or 
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polishing floors.") (emphasis added); cf 96 A.L.R.3d at 1223-25 (discussing a store's 
liability for the repair activities of independent contractors) with 63 A.L.R.2d 641-42 
(discussing a store's liability for the acts of independent contractors for causing a floor to 
be slippery). Cleaning a store's floor clearly falls within the parameters of the general 
upkeep of a store and can rightly be considered a maintenance activity. 
Here, Smith's delegated its floor cleaning maintenance activity to an independent 
contractor by delegating the duty of cleaning the floor of the demonstration area to the 
food demonstrator (Mr. Tyler). Chuck Brown, the Smith's manager at the time of Ms. 
Price's accident, testified that it was store policy to have the food demonstrator clean up 
after the demonstration. R. 281 (deposition of Mr. Brown stating, "Our policy with [food 
demonstrators] is that they clean up their area"); see also R. 278. Mr. Brown further 
testified that not only was it not store policy to clean up after a demonstration, it was not 
general store procedure either. R. 277. Mr. Brown explained that the person who signed 
out the food demonstrator would probably have been too busy with customers or produce 
to check the demonstration area following the demonstration. R. 277. 
There is evidence that the independent contractor was negligent in carrying out the 
cleaning duty delegated to him. Mr. Brown testified that the spilled water came from the 
food demonstration table, that he saw the water on the table, that the water most likely 
got spilled when Mr. Tyler took down the demonstration table, and that there was no 
other way for water to have gotten on the floor where it was when Judy Price fell on it. 
R. 426-27. Mr. Tyler, in contradiction to Mr. Brown's testimony, testified that he had no 
water on his table. R. 365-66. Nevertheless, it is not for the court to weigh the evidence 
15 
presented to it, but rather, it is a jury's job to determine what evidence it finds more 
persuasive. Draper City v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
Because Smith's delegated a store maintenance activity (cleaning the floor) to an 
independent contractor, Smith's can be vicariously liable for the injuries caused by the 
negligent acts of the independent contractor. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Price respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's ruling 
granting Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment because evidence was presented about 
the length of time the dangerous condition was on the floor, and because Smith's can be 
liable for the negligence of their independent contractor. Mrs. Price respectfully requests 
that the Court remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Tyler S.Young (11325) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
801-379-0700 
Sophie Hayes (12546) 
485 East 400 South 
Provo, Utah 84606 
917-547-9413 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing, Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant Judy Price, 
and an electronic copy of the brief on a computer disc were mailed U.S. Mail, postage paid, to 
the following this 3 - M " day of / W / 1 , 2010: 
Todd C. Hilbig 
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C. 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
17 
ADDENDUM 
Memorandum Decision of the Honorable Steven L. Hansen dated August 13, 2009 1-10 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Final Judgment 11-15 
18 
A P R
 * " /OO: 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDY PRICE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SMITH'S FOOD AND DRUG et al., 
Defendants. 
DECISION 
Date: April 13, 2009 
Case No. 060401509 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 2 
The matter before the court is the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant 
Smith's Food and Drug ("Smith's") on November 5, 2008, with supporting memorandum. 
Plaintiff Judy Price ("Plaintiff') filed an opposition on November 26, 2008. Smith's filed its 
reply memorandum on December 9, 2008, along with a motion in limine and supporting 
memorandum to strike the report and affidavit of Kent Steele ("Mr. Steele"), Plaintiffs 
purported negligence expert. The motion in limine also requested that the court preclude Mr. 
Steele from testifying at trial. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion in limine on January 9, 
2009 and requested oral arguments. Smith's filed a reply on January 22, 2009 and a request to 
submit both motions for decision on January 23, 2009. Oral arguments were held on March 2, 
2009. The court now issues this decision granting the motion for summary judgment on all four 
causes of action alleged by Plaintiff against Smith's. This decision renders moot the motion in 
limine, so the court does not discuss it further. 
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On April 2, 2005, Plaintiff and her granddaughter Judy Chance went to the American 
Fork Smith's store. When they were walking from the produce section of the store toward the 
check stands, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a water spill that was outside of the produce section but 
near the bread aisle. Plaintiff thinks the accident occurred around 5:00 p.m. or shortly thereafter, 
and the Smith's store manager, Chuck Brown ("Mr. Brown"), believes that Plaintiff fell at 5:00 
p.m. or minutes thereafter. Plaintiff does not know how the water got on the floor, how long it 
had been there prior to her fall, or if any of the employees of Smith's knew about the water spill 
No employee of Smith's was aware of the water spill prior to Plaintiffs fall. On the day of the 
accident, employees had inspected the store floors ten times between 4:24 p.m. and 5:38 p.m. 
Mr. Brown stated at his deposition that he was almost certain that the water came from a 
demonstrator for Market Source, Stephen Tyler ("Mr. Tyler"), who was demonstrating meats and 
cheeses in that general area of the store from 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on that day. In his 
deposition, Mr. Brown stated that he remembered seeing a cup of water on Mr. Tyler's table at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. Mr. Brown also stated that Plaintiff slipped and fell in the area where 
Mr. Tyler had been demonstrating before leaving at 5:00 p.m. and there are no other nearby 
sources of water where Plaintiff slipped and fell. At his deposition, Mr. Tyler denied having any 
water at his table, stressing that it would pose a food safety risk. Mr. Tyler was not an employee 
of Smith's, but was a demonstrator for Market Source, wore a Market Source uniform, and was 
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compensated by Market Source. Mr. Tyler was not compensated by Smith's. Mr. Brown 
testified at his deposition that Smith's checked Mr. Tyler in when he got there and out when he 
left by essentially signing paperwork to verify the amount of time Mr. Tyler spent there. In 
addition, Mr. Brown testified that, as a matter of course, he would help a demonstrator find an 
appropriate area to set up their demonstration and then leave them to do the demonstration. 
ANALYSIS 
As noted by both parties, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions 
for summary judgment and establishes that summary judgment shall be granted if the party 
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c) (2008). Paragraph (e) of Rule 56 
requires that affidavits made to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment "shall be 
made on personal knowledge" and "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Id. at (e). 
In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact presented in the 
pleadings and the affidavits, the courts "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Matheson v. Marbec 
Investments, LLC, 2007 UT App 363, ^ [5, 173 P.3d 199 (original quotation marks and citation 
omitted). In addition, the Utah appellate courts have noted that "because negligence cases often 
require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than 
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judges, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Id. 
(original quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying these standards to this case, the court 
concludes that, viewing the facts and the inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and Smith's is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
A. Negligence 
Plaintiffs ordinary negligence claim against Smith's must fail as a matter of law because 
there is no evidence that Smith's or its employees or agents created the dangerous condition, or 
that Smith's had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The Utah Supreme 
Court recently decided Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, 196 P.3d 576, and clarified Utah premises 
liability law. The court explained, 
To recover under a temporary unsafe condition theory, a plaintiff must show that (1) the 
defendant had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge or constructive 
knowledge because the condition existed long enough that he should have discovered it; 
and (2) after obtaining such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of 
reasonable care he should have remedied it. We have also held that the variant of this 
rule is that if the unsafe condition or defect was created by the defendant himself or his 
agents or employees, the notice requirement does not apply. 
Id. at T| 16 (original quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not argued, 
nor is there any evidence, that Smith's or its employees or agents created the dangerous condition 
of water on the floor. Plaintiff also seems to concede that Smith's had no actual knowledge of 
the water on the floor, and again, there is no evidence showing that Smith's had actual 
knowledge, nor are there any genuine issues of material fact regarding actual knowledge of 
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Smith's or its employees. 
Plaintiff relies on the imputation of constructive knowledge to Smith's for her negligence 
claim. Plaintiff asserts, through her purported expert Mr. Steele, that the failure of Smith's to 
check the vendor's area immediately upon his departure warrants the imputation of constructive 
notice. However, Plaintiffs interpretation of constructive notice is much broader than the 
interpretation given by the Utah Supreme Court in Jex, in which the court explained "the 
importance of the time factor" in determining whether constructive notice can be imputed in a 
given case. Id. at [^18. The court further explained, 
To establish that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store owner 
constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present evidence that would show that it had 
been there for an appreciable time. We have therefore imputed constructive notice to a 
store owner only when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris has been on 
the floor. 
Id. at TJ19. The court concluded that constructive notice has not been imputed by that court in 
cases like Jex, "where there is no evidence regarding the amount of time the unsafe condition has 
existed." Id. The court affirmed the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals that "conjecture and 
speculation is the only way to determine the length of time the puddle was on the floor, and thus 
it would be improper to impute constructive notice to Defendants." Id. at [^21 (citing Jex v. JRA, 
Inc., 2007 UT App 249,1J16, 166 P.3d 655) (original quotation marks omitted). 
The lack of evidence regarding the length of time the puddle had been on the floor when 
Plaintiff slipped is analogous to that of Jex. The fact that Mr. Steele believes that Smith's should 
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have inspected Mr. Tyler's area upon his departure does not overcome the fatal flaw that Plaintiff 
has shown no evidence of the length of time the puddle was on the floor. In the absence of any 
such evidence, this court is unable to impute constructive notice to Smith's regarding the 
presence of the water puddle on the floor. Therefore, Smith's has shown that it is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs negligence claim. 
B. Negligence-Vicarious Liability 
Smith's is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs vicarious 
liability claim. Plaintiff attempts to bypass the elements of a premises liability case as they have 
been established by the Utah appellate courts and create a new test, claiming that Smith's owed 
Plaintiff an absolute duty which was breached when Mr. Tyler allegedly spilled his water. 
Asserting that Smith's owed an absolute duty to Plaintiff or any of its customers contradicts the 
statement made repeatedly by the Utah Supreme Court in the context of slip and fall cases that 
"the owner of a business is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall[.]" Jex, 
2008 UT 67, TJ25 (quoting Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996)); 
Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973); Koer v. May/air Markets, 431 
P.2d 566 (Utah 1967). 
The court in Jex went on to explain that a business owner is nonetheless "charged with 
the duty to use reasonable care to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe 
condition for his patrons." 2008 UT 67, TJ25 (quoting Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478). In 
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interpreting the extent of this duty, the courts have created the framework described above, 
requiring a person who has been injured by a temporary dangerous condition to show (1) that the 
store owner had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition created by a third party or 
that the dangerous condition was created by the store owner herself, her agents or employees; and 
(2) that the store owner had sufficient time to remedy the temporary dangerous condition but 
failed to do so. Jex, 2008 UT 67, If 16 (citations omitted). Therefore, the only way that Smith's 
could be liable for Mr. Tyler's actions is if Mr. Tyler was an agent or employee of Smith's at the 
time the accident occurred since it is undisputed that Smith's had no actual or constructive notice 
of the water spill. 
The undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Mr. Tyler was neither an employee 
nor an agent of Smith's at the time of the accident. In her memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff 
conceded for purposes of this motion that Mr. Tyler was not an employee of Smith's and that he 
was not compensated by Smith's in any way. However, even if Plaintiff had not conceded this 
point, it is clear from the depositions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Tyler that Mr. Tyler was employed 
by Market Source at the time of the accident and has never been employed by Smith's. Nor is 
there any evidence that Mr. Tyler had apparent or actual authority to act in behalf of Smith's, 
thereby becoming its agent. 
However, even if Mr. Tyler were Smith's agent, Plaintiff would then have to provide 
evidence that Smith's had sufficient time to remedy the temporary dangerous condition but failed 
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to do so. As noted above, there is absolutely no evidence regarding the length of time the water 
remained on the floor before Plaintiff fell. This case is substantially similar to Lindsay v. Eccles 
Hotel Co., 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), and the cases that follow therefrom. As noted by Smith's, 
in Lindsay the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment in a 
premises liability case, explaining that "there was no evidence as to how the water got onto the 
floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there or that the defendant had 
knowledge of its presence. Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate 
that the defendant was negligent." Id. at 478. Because there is no evidence of how long the 
water was on the floor in this case, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that Smith's was 
negligent in failing to remove the water. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim for vicarious liability fails 
as a matter of law, and Smith's is entitled to summary judgment. 
C. Negligence- Failure to Supervise 
Smith's is likewise entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs failure 
to supervise claim. The same analysis applies here as that regarding the claim for vicarious 
liability—the only way that Smith's could be responsible for Mr. Tyler spilling water on the floor 
is if Smith's had actual or constructive notice of the spill or if Mr. Tyler were an employee or 
agent of Smith's. As discussed above, there is no evidence that Smith's had notice of any kind, 
that Mr. Tyler was an employee or agent of Smith's, or how long the water had been on the floor 
prior to Plaintiffs accident. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim for negligent supervision must fail as a 
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matter of law. 
D. Res Ipsa Loquitur 
Plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur claim fails as a matter of law. The doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply in this case. In Walker v. Parish Chemical Co., the Utah Court of 
Appeals explained, "[BJecause an instruction on res ipsa loquitur allows a jury to infer 
negligence from the type of accident itself, there must be a basis either in common knowledge or 
expert testimony that when such an accident occurs, it is more probably than not the result of 
negligence." 914 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (original quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Utah appellate courts have established that a slip and fall is not the type of accident 
that justifies an inference that it is more probably than not the result of negligence. Indeed, the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "negligence will not be presumed" in slip and fall cases, Jex, 
2008 UT 67, ^26 (citation omitted), and that "[t]he mere proof of injury within a store...does not 
raise, without more evidence, an inference that the defendant had control or any notice of the 
object causing the injury within the store nor does it presume that he was negligent." Koer, 431 
P.2d at 569. Additionally, in Schnuphase, which also concerned a slip and fall accident in a 
grocery store, the Utah Supreme Court explained, 'Thousands of accidents occur every day for 
which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even the ones who are 
injured." 918 P.2d at 479-80 (quoting Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 
1980)). 
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These cases are directly on point and controlling in this case. In the absence of any 
evidence that Smith's or its employees were negligent, the law will not allow an inference of 
negligence simply because Plaintiff was injured in the Smith's store. Therefore, the court 
concludes, and the case law mandates, that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case and that 
Smith's is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of the 
length of time the puddle of water was on the floor. In the absence of such evidence, the court 
cannot impute constructive notice of the water, nor can it allow a jury to speculate that Smith's 
negligently failed to remedy the situation in a reasonable amount of time. In addition, because a 
slip and fall is not the type of accident that is more probably than not the result of negligence, res 
ipsa loquitur does not apply in this case. Therefore, Smith's is entitled to summary judgment on 
all claims. Counsel for Smith's shall prepare an appropriate order consistent with this decision 
for signature by the court. 
DATED this __L3__ day of 
Case No. 060401509 
, 2009^238!^ 
Ste< 
District CouiiS 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDY M. PRICE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS 
INC., an Ohio Corporation, PYGGY, INC., 
a Nevada Corporation, dba MARKET 
SOURCE WEST, and JOHN DOES I-V 
inclusive, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 060401509 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
THIS MATTER was before the Court on March 2, 2009, on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., a Defendant in the above-entitled action, with 
Tyler S. Young appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, and Stephen F. Edwards appearing as attorney 
for Defendant; and 
After reading the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Memoranda in Support Thereof, the 
Memorandum in Opposition Thereto, and after oral argument on March 2, 2009, and being fully 
advised in the premises and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 
1. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted on all four 
causes of action alleged by Plaintiff against Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. on the grounds set 
forth in the Parties' Memoranda and attached pleadings, affidavits, deposition testimony, and other 
evidence, on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the Defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as set forth in this Court's Decision of April 13, 
2009. Summary Judgment is granted on the following grounds: 
a. There is no evidence Defendant created or had actual or constructive notice 
of a water hazard prior to the alleged slip and fall incident. 
In order to recover under a temporary unsafe condition theory where the defendant did not 
create the dangerous condition, the case of Jex v. JRA, Inc., 196 P.3d 576 (Utah 2008) and other 
Utah law require that a plaintiff must show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge 
of the dangerous condition and that after obtaining such notice, sufficient time elapsed that in the 
exercise of reasonable care, the defendant should have remedied the unsafe condition. There is no 
evidence that Defendant or its agents created the dangerous condition at issue. There is no 
evidence that Defendant had actual notice of the dangerous condition. Constructive notice of the 
dangerous condition may not be imputed because there is no evidence regarding the length of time 
the dangerous condition had been present prior to Plaintiffs incident. 
b. Plaintiffs claim for vicarious liability fails as a matter of law. 
Utah law provides that an owner of a business is not a guarantor that the owner's business 
invitees will not slip and fall. In order to recover under a temporary unsafe condition theory where 
the defendant did not create the dangerous condition, Utah law requires that a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and that after 
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obtaining such notice, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care, the defendant 
should have remedied the unsafe condition. In the present matter, Defendant did not owe Plaintiff 
an absolute duty that could have been breached even if Mr. Stephen Tyler allegedly spilled the 
water on which Plaintiff slipped and fell. Mr. Tyler was not an employee or agent of Defendant 
but was employed by Market Source. Furthermore, there is no evidence regarding how long the 
dangerous condition was present prior to Plaintiffs incident. 
c. Plaintiffs claim for negligent supervision fails as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs negligent supervision cause of action fails because Defendant did not have actual 
or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and because Mr. Tyler was not an employee or 
agent of Defendant but was employed by Market Source. 
d. Res ipsa loquitur does not apply to this case. 
Utah law does not permit the presumption of negligence in slip and fall cases. Utah law 
precludes an inference that the defendant had control or any notice of the cause of injury within the 
store without more evidence than the mere proof of injury within a store. Therefore, Plaintiffs res 
ipsa loquitur cause of action fails as a matter of law, and Defendant is entitled to summary 
judgment. 
3. The granting of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is dispositive of the 
case. 
4. Plaintiffs Complaint and all causes of action asserted therein are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice as to Defendant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.; and, 
5. Defendant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. is awarded its costs as are 
allowed by law. 
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DATED this ^ -day ofk^ay, 2009. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Tyler S. Young 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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